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Abstract Social accountability has become an important new buzzword among development actors
seeking to understand the forms of state-society synergy that may be supportive of better public services.
Advocates suggest demand-side initiatives are key to increasing the power of the poor in service provision,
while sceptics question the application of technical ﬁxes to complex political challenges. This article reports
ﬁndings from qualitative research into the political capabilities outcomes achieved among local health and
education stakeholders through the social accountability interventions of a non-governmental organisation
(NGO) in Western Uganda. It argues that NGOs are unlikely to generate substantive advances for social
accountability in agrarian contexts characterised by patronage politics without organising marginalised
groups themselves to tackle the causes of their disadvantage.
La redevabilité sociale est devenue un nouveau mot clé à la mode au sein des acteurs du développement qui
cherchent à comprendre les différentes formes de synergie entre état et société qui pourraient favoriser de
meilleurs services publics. Les partisans de la redevabilité sociale suggèrent que les initiatives du côté de la
demande sont clés pour augmenter le pouvoir des pauvres dans la prestation de services, alors les sceptiques
remettent en question l’application de solutions techniques pour régler des problèmes politiques complexes.
Cet article relate les conclusions d’une étude qualitative relative à la capacité politique au sein d’acteurs
sanitaires et éducatifs locaux, qui a été rendue possible grâce à une intervention sur la redevabilité sociale,
mise en œuvre par une organisation non-gouvernementale (ONG) dans l’Ouest de l’Ouganda. L’étude
démontre que les ONG sont peu susceptibles de provoquer des avancées importantes en redevabilité sociale
dans les contextes agraires, qui sont caractérisés par un patronage politique, sans appuyer l’organisation des
groupes marginalisés eux-mêmes aﬁn qu’ils s’attaquent aux causes de leur désavantage.
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Introduction
Under the current inclusive liberal development paradigm, the active involvement of citizens in
holding public service providers accountable is considered critical to increasing ‘the power of
poor clients in service provision’ (World Bank, 2004, p. 64). Recent assessments ﬁnd that a
complex web of incentives, interests and political-economic power relations frequently under-
mine institutional and technical mechanisms for monitoring and claims-making by citizens and
their representatives (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012; Gaventa and McGee, 2013). Increasingly,
development agencies seek to better understand how greater social accountability can be
achieved under particular political-economic conditions (DFID, 2011; Bukenya et al, 2012),
while scholars interested in ‘putting the politics back in’ to development have sought out more
politicised frameworks for the study of outcomes for disadvantaged groups (Hickey, 2009).
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Researchers are divided about the contribution non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can
make to greater social accountability, which in itself is a contested concept, but is understood here
as ‘citizen-led action for demanding accountability from providers’ (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012,
p. 146). NGOs are credited with representing marginalised groups within formal policy-making
spaces (Driscoll and Evans, 2005), facilitating citizen participation within decentralised govern-
ance spaces (Corbridge et al, 2005), and convening new created spaces for claims-making and
deliberation (Mitlin and Bebbington, 2006). Questions continue to be raised, however, as to
whether such donor-funded initiatives enhance or undermine state legitimacy and performance
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Stel and Abate, 2014). In addition, recent studies of effective
participatory rural development suggest that co-governance mechanisms are more likely to have
substantive outcomes for political equality when underpinned by pro-poor agrarian reform
(Bhattacharya and Bhattacharyya, 2013).
This article responds to calls for more politicised assessments of demand-side initiatives, in
particular political economies, by applying a political capabilities analysis to qualitative data
about a series of strategies for enhanced social accountability employed by a research and
development NGO (henceforth ‘RD’) in Western Uganda. The discussion begins with a review of
recent debates concerning the appropriate roles for NGOs within social accountability dynamics
in developing contexts, and then introduces Williams’ (2004) political capabilities analysis as a
suitable evaluative framework for such initiatives. The political space for social accountability in
contemporary Uganda is then considered, and a brief overview of the research methodology
provided. RD’s social accountability interventions are then introduced and analysed in terms of
the political capabilities outcomes achieved, and the political-economic and strategic drivers and
constraints that have shaped them. The article draws two conclusions in response to the two main
debates framing the discussion. First, NGOs can pursue strategies for social accountability that
strengthen rather than erode existing democratic institutions and processes in weak or fragile
states. Second, such strategies are unlikely to do more than ameliorate the status quo in short-term
and limited ways, if they fail to organise low-income groups in ways that challenge the social
norms and power relations that obstruct effective popular pressure for better public goods
outcomes in agrarian contexts, characterised by semi-authoritarian political regimes.
NGOs and Social Accountability
Social accountability initiatives can broadly be grouped into either transparency initiatives (such
as budget and expenditure monitoring); contentious actions (such as protests and advocacy
campaigns); or participation in formal governance spaces (Bukenya et al, 2012; Joshi and
Houtzager, 2012). Another important distinction made in studies of such initiatives is between
outcomes of ‘answerability’ (the provision of information and justiﬁcations) and of ‘enforcement’
(the suffering of penalties) (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). NGOs are considered legitimate actors in
the social accountability arena because of their staff’s frequent dual positioning as highly
educated elites, able to mobilise resources to support their activities, and as grassroots
participatory facilitators, able to mediate state/citizen relations at the local level, translate popular
claims-making into formal discourse, and explain complex policies in everyday language
(Corbridge et al, 2005; Bázan et al, 2008).
Responses to the social accountability agenda, and perspectives on the role of NGOs
in promoting it, have been mixed. While post-colonial analyses question whether elite,
professionalised NGO workers can genuinely understand and effectively channel the interests of
low-income marginalised groups (Chatterjee, 2004), others highlight the political capital
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generated by their ability to move with ﬂuidity between state, market and civil society spheres
(Uvin and Miller, 1996; Lavalle et al, 2005). Middle-class professionals have also been found to
be critical mediators within the cross-class alliances that have contributed to the effectiveness of
demand-side initiatives (Jenkins, 2006). Beyond the class composition of NGOs, assessments of
social accountability initiatives increasingly cast doubt over technical approaches that fail to
address politics and power relations. Recent studies critique the World Bank’s emphasis on
technical tools or ‘widgets’ (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012), such as score cards and experimental
designs, which disguise the politics of accountability by constructing citizens as beneﬁciaries and
NGOs as representatives of their individualised concerns, rather than as facilitators of popular
mobilisation (Gaventa and McGee, 2013). The limited outcomes achieved by donor-funded
social accountability initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa have also been linked to a failure to engage
with the structure of social and political-economic power relations, and informal incentive
structures (Booth, 2012). Such ﬁndings resonate with studies that suggest better governance
outcomes in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal have been linked to pro-poor agrarian
reform, which shifts the balance of political-economic power from landlords to tenants and
smallholders (Sandbrook et al, 2007; Bhattacharya and Bhattacharyya, 2013).
Despite these increasing calls for a more politicised approach, scholars also warn of the
dangers of undermining state legitimacy (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005) or provoking an uncoopera-
tive state response (Mitlin, 2013) by taking a confrontational approach to poor governance.
Researchers also continue to identify opportunities within formal participatory governance spaces
for citizenship building (Corbridge et al, 2005), particularly when these are combined with
institutional reform that hence tackles ‘both sides of the equation’ (Gaventa, 2004). Working to
democratise existing spaces, NGOs are credited with building popular capacity for participation
through the provision of training and information about strategies for engagement, policies,
services, and particularly budgets and expenditures (Corbridge et al, 2005); or acting as
representatives by lobbying for redistributive reforms focused on socio-economic as well as civil
and political rights (Driscoll and Evans, 2005). NGO engagement in aggregating and channelling
claims-making has been framed as building state capacity for responsiveness while equipping
state ofﬁcials with necessary information and awareness, creating more conducive conditions for
collaborative planning and implementation processes, and thereby strengthening rather than
undermining existing democratic channels, as well as developing alternative routes for claims-
making (Gaventa, 2004; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). Increasingly, activist scholars draw
attention to the need for ‘popular organisation building’ among marginalised groups to enable
their accumulation of the collective power, knowledge and conﬁdence, necessary to tackle
exclusionary norms, values and power relations (Törnquist, 2009; Mitlin, 2013).
Assessing Political Capabilities for Social Accountability
Concerns that participation has been reframed as technical practice (rather than political action)
have catalysed theorisation of more politicised frameworks for analysing the outcomes of
participatory initiatives for disadvantaged groups. One of these is Williams’ (2004) political
capabilities analysis, which seeks to capture the longer-term political value of participatory
initiatives for marginalised people by focusing on changes along three dimensions. The ﬁrst
dimension is concerned with the extent to which initiatives catalyse political learning. This
includes increased knowledge of formal rights and procedures, but importantly also the informal
rules of the game, and a deeper understanding of how power operates within social and political
relations. The second dimension considers whether initiatives have re-shaped the political
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networks through which disadvantaged groups can advance their interests, and might include
changes to the roles of traditional brokers or patrons, the development of relationships beyond the
immediate local arena, and changes in the interests and motivations of actors within a particular
network of relations. The third dimension draws attention to the ways in which patterns of
representation have changed, which might manifest in changes to the language of political
claims-making, challenges to repressive or exclusionary political norms, shifts in local cultures of
governance or in the extent to which alternative ways of thinking about or doing development are
emerging or being imagined (Williams, 2004, p. 568).
These themes suggest that Williams’ framework is well suited to both assessing the
empowerment outcomes of participatory social accountability initiatives, and to exploring the
effects of power relations and informal (as well as formal) incentives and processes that a series of
synthesis papers have found critical to understanding social accountability dynamics (Cornwall
et al, 2011; Bukenya et al, 2012; Gaventa and McGee, 2013).
Political Space for Social Accountability in Museveni’s Uganda
Uganda presents a particularly interesting case for an investigation into the ways in which NGOs
can advance social accountability within challenging political-economic environments. During
the 1990s, Uganda was hailed as a beacon of good practice for poverty reduction through
economic liberalisation and good governance, including a pioneering approach to participatory
poverty reduction strategy making focused on achievement of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), and extensive decentralisation reforms (Craig and Porter, 2006). Since claiming
power in 1986, Museveni has overseen sustained economic growth and, after 25 years of political
upheaval, it is difﬁcult to overstate the signiﬁcance of the stability and rehabilitation secured by
the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Yet, the regime was recently characterised as semi-
authoritarian (Tripp, 2010) on the basis of a gradual erosion of civil and political rights,
increasingly centralised control over resources and potential opponents through a system of
corruption-fuelled political patronage, populist policy making, and mounting military expendi-
ture and presence (Kasﬁr, 2012). Concerns have been raised about rising levels of inequality and
the disparity between poverty reduction statistics and the absence of substantive development
among smallholders and subsistence farmers, who comprise approximately 70 per cent of the
population (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010).
Recent studies of social accountability have generated diverse and sometimes contradictory
ﬁndings1 about the kinds of supply- or demand-side strategies that might generate pro-poor
outcomes in Uganda at the current juncture (Robinson, 2006; Hubbard, 2007; Reinikka and
Svensson, 2004). The institutional framework for social accountability in Uganda has been
shaped by both decentralisation policy and sector-speciﬁc reforms. Local government is
structured according to the ﬁve-tier resistance council model established during the 1981–1986
guerrilla war, when Museveni’s National Resistance Army established self-management
structures for local residents as it gained ground across the country. The village council is a
shared deliberative, judicial and administrative space for village residents led by an executive
appointed by the chair. At sub-county level, the council operates like a parliament with elected
councillors representing parishes, and technical ofﬁcials responsible for health, education and
development implementation. The district council is the highest local government tier and the
chair the most powerful local government seat, with overall control over service delivery in the
district (Green, 2008). In 2005, after 10 years of a merit-based ‘no-party’ system, the NRM
opened up Ugandan politics to multi-party electoral competition (simultaneously extending
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Presidential term limits), but opposition parties have struggled to generate the necessary
resources and mass popular support to compete effectively.
In theory, decentralisation has facilitated direct citizen participation in development planning
and service delivery and the investment of large amounts of sector-speciﬁc ﬁnance in local
government (Craig and Porter, 2006). In practice, mechanisms for citizen participation have been
tokenistic, fail to tackle entrenched social hierarchies (Golooba-Mutebi, 2004) and decentra-
lisation has created endless opportunities for patronage (Tripp, 2010). The control of staff
appointments by a District Services Commission whose members are selected under the inﬂuence
of the district council executive has led to posts being granted along ethnic lines and has
undermined accountability, as job security depends on favour rather than performance (Tripp,
2010). Incessant district creation taking the total number from 33 in 1986 to 118 in 2010 has also
enabled the widespread cooptation of local elites by the NRM, while exacerbating ethnic tensions
by consolidating administrations around majority ethnic groups (Green, 2008).
The dynamics of populist policy making and patronage-politics manifest clearly within local
health and education governance. The announcement of Universal Primary Education in the run
up to the 1996 Presidential elections (including the abolition of Parent Teacher Association
(PTA) fees), the abolition of health service user fees ahead of the 2001 elections, and the
announcement of Universal Secondary Education before the 2006 contest have all met with
international approval while mobilising the popular vote, but in the long run undermined the quality
of service provision and social accountability (Ssewankambo et al, 2008; Kjær and Therkildsen,
2013). The abolition of parent and health service user fees, while in principle pro-poor, has in effect
led to vast increases in demand without related increases in human resource capacity and adequate
ﬁnancial investment. School enrolments increased from 2.6 million in 1996 to 5.3 million the
following year, without sufﬁcient investment of resources or preparatory work to manage the
transition (Tripp, 2010). The abolition of fees has also undermined incentives for downward
accountability with local staff accountable to district-level patrons and district civil servants
accountable to central government or international donors (Higgins and Rwanyange, 2005).
Participatory governance mechanisms like user committees and parent-teacher associations have
been left without a substantive role to play, as under the ‘Sector Wide Approaches’ introduced
in part as a mechanism for achievement of the MDGs, resource allocation became highly
centralised (Craig and Porter, 2006). Local government resources that might once have contributed
towards local service improvements have also been depleted since the abolition of Graduated
Personal Tax (a form of income tax) in 2005 ahead of the multi-party elections (Ssewankambo
et al, 2008).
The ﬁndings to be presented below come to demonstrate how this combination of semi-
authoritarian control over potential sites of opposition, patronage-politics and an agrarian culture
of deference to social superiors, presents a highly constrained political space for NGOs seeking to
promote greater social accountability in rural Uganda.
Methodology
The qualitative ﬁndings presented below are based on 12-months doctoral research conducted
between 2009 and 2011 into RD’s ability to cultivate supportive conditions for social democratic
development. One strand of this research examined the extent to which RD had enhanced the
political capabilities of rural communities to demand greater social accountability for the
provision of primary health care and education services.
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RD was selected according to a theory testing logic (Yin, 1984) in response to its reputation
among donors and national civil society actors for fostering shifts in state/citizen relations within
the Rwenzori region making it an anomalous case in comparison to most other literature on
Ugandan civil society, which suggests NGOs are too weak to shape political space. RD was also
selected because of the relevance of their ‘hybrid’ approach and character (Bázan et al, 2008) to
an investigation of conﬂicting perspectives in the literature about the ways in which NGOs should
engage with democratisation in different kinds of political-economic contexts. RD employs
diverse strategies at multiple levels based on an ideological commitment to socio-economic and
political empowerment, working within the existing system rather than imagining systemic
change (Bázan et al, 2008). It attempts to support small-holder farmers to access markets for
example, but does not engage in campaigns for land reform.
Fieldwork methods included review of organisational documentation, semi-structured observa-
tion of organisational practice, and a total of 123 semi-structured interviews and 20 focus group
discussions with a range of state, civil society and political actors at multiple levels of organisational
operation. Research examining RD’s social accountability interventions focused principally on two
sample sub-counties within two sample districts, selected because together they offered insight into
the fullest range of the organisation’s interventions and a broad contextual range.
Theoretical and context-speciﬁc literature shaped a process of qualitative analytical categor-
isations that focused on political capabilities analysis of outcomes, and analysis of interlinking
dimensions of political economy and strategic capacity, shaping RD’s behaviour and effects
within the sample sub-counties. Data reliability and validity has been built upon the triangulation
of data from interviews, focus groups and observations generated with the breadth of actors
described above, and evaluation of weight, quality and theoretical signiﬁcance (Miles and
Huberman, 1994).
Cultivating Social Accountability in the Rwenzori Sub-region
Rwenzori is a predominantly agrarian sub-region that has suffered from repeated ethnic conﬂict and
experiences poverty and population growth above the national average.2 RD was founded as a non-
membership research institute in 1996 by a group of locally born university graduates seeking to
generate knowledge about how to bring greater development to the area. As the NGO boom took
effect in Uganda at the turn of the millennium, RD drifted away from research towards
implementation of donor-driven development projects. By 2010, the organisation had an interna-
tional donor-funded budget of approximately GBP £702 thousand, and a staff team of 28 graduates.
The social accountability interventions examined below have been signiﬁcantly shaped by
donor agendas, and the rise of the participation agenda within international development
discourse. RD’s participatory approach followed a similar trajectory to many other attempts at
participation for transformation (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Although early work with a British
consultant focused on developing a participatory action learning system that could support
Frierian-style conscientization for social and political change, this eventually resulted in a toolkit
of participatory exercises that might assist civil society workers and rural communities to monitor
local resources.
The ﬁrst intervention discussed below attempts to use this participatory toolkit to increase
accountability for health and education provision through training, monitoring and capacity
building within local governance structures. The programme has been running in various guises
in the sample sub-counties since 2005, but expanded in scope under the latest programme (2008–
2011), from 9 to 23 sub-counties. Health and education have always been primary concerns, but
King
892 © 2015 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811
European Journal of Development Research Vol. 27, 5, 887–902
the latest programme has also focused down speciﬁcally on encouraging citizen monitoring of
primary health centres and schools in order to report and resolve problems throughout the
governance structure. Two staff members managed the initiative during the latest phase working
through a team of 23 Community Process Facilitators (CPFs) who operate at sub-county level.
In theory, CPFs are locally embedded activists but in practice, operate more like sub-contracted
NGO trainers.
Outputs for the ﬁrst year of the latest 36-months programme included training new CPFs in
using the toolkit; 12 village meetings about the roles and responsibilities of service users and
providers in ensuring quality health and education service provision; four training sessions each
for school and health centre management committees, and four for village, parish and sub-county
councillors; and a series of dialogue meetings – two at sub-county level and two at district level.
Most of these activities involve working within existing participatory governance spaces, except
the dialogues. Sub-county dialogues are a new space paid for and facilitated by RD, where
management committees, civil servants, political leaders and community leaders come together
and discuss issues raised during village, parish and parents’ meetings, or gathered through the
monitoring activities of management committee members and councillors. They are founded on
an ‘appreciative inquiry’ approach through which staff and CPFs facilitate non-confrontational
deliberation and solution development, which is intended to build positive relationships across
state-political-civil divides and divert the emphasis of discussions away from ‘ﬁnger-pointing’.
In 2006, RD was nominated to participate in a consortium initiated by a multi-lateral donor
and a central government ministry for the development of a public expenditure monitoring toolkit
for Civil Society Organisations, which could provide more robust and easily aggregated evidence
on public service effectiveness. The consortium subsequently collapsed, but RD continued to
take the piloting forward because the initiative presented an opportunity to address demands from
civil servants and politicians in Rwenzori for more robust research evidence to support claims-
making. RD adapted these research instruments for a mixed-methods study of value for money in
the primary health and education sectors across the region, in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The
research combined quantitative surveys and reviews of health centre and school records with
participatory discussions with parents and service users, to generate evidence for deliberation at
district dialogues in an attempt to tackle social accountability at a more senior level.3
The Political Economy of Social Accountability in Rural Uganda
Training Local Stakeholders to Monitor Services
RD’s training has generated limited but positive results for the effectiveness of school and health
unit management committees, by engaging members in a process of political learning about
formal rights and procedures. Members had an increased understanding of their roles after RD
training, resulting in increased monitoring of teacher and pupil or health worker attendance and
ﬁnances. One school management committee member explained that, since RD training, the
committee has begun to check the arrival of central government funds and approve quarterly
budgets. Less positively, health and school management committee members engaged during the
research deﬁned accountability in terms of checking that money had come in rather than
monitoring whether it had been spent according to budget, and increases in knowledge and
monitoring activity were counter-acted by their lack of authority to enforce sanctions. Teacher
absenteeism was a continual problem, and although management committee members could
challenge teachers or attempt to negotiate for improved behaviour, actions agreed during
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governance meetings, and reports submitted to RD by the CPFs, suggested that they were either
unwilling or had no authority to take more punitive action. The training had therefore not been
able to bring about signiﬁcant changes within the underlying culture of governance.
Political capabilities outcomes among councillors were much the same. Councillors had
experienced political learning about the de jure rules of the game, but learning had not
signiﬁcantly impacted on their political networks or patterns of representation in their local
arena. Interviewees could explain how to go about monitoring public services, and stressed that
before RD training they did not know that this was part of their role, but were unable to provide
examples of systematic monitoring with constituents to hold public servants accountable for their
duties. Three councillors described either visiting their local primary school, or carrying out ad
hoc monitoring of construction works following RD training, but this was done individually, and
at face value, rather than against a bill of quantities that were difﬁcult to access.4 One parish
councillor reported sub-standard work being carried out during construction of a local latrine. The
sub-county chief ignored his request to withhold payment to the contractor and the toilet
collapsed a few months later, but the councillor felt that there was nothing further he could do in
this case because the chief was beyond his ﬁeld of inﬂuence. He also suggested that the chief had
probably beneﬁted from the poor quality work: ‘When the construction of the latrine takes ﬁve
million, they have to take those [materials] that cost less so they put it in their pockets’. This was
typical of other instances in the data that suggested that despite RD’s training, councillors were
either unable to strategise about who had the power to resolve a problem and how to inﬂuence
them, or unwilling to rock the boat by challenging their superiors.
Neither had RD training contributed signiﬁcantly to increased consciousness about social
norms and power relations, meaning parents and service users remained reluctant to monitor or
challenge local teachers and health workers as their social superiors. One health worker explained
how his predecessor was a ‘small king’ within the community whom local residents lacked the
conﬁdence to challenge, and who was protected from being held to account for poor performance
by friendships with local political leaders. Poorer members of a community may also be
more concerned about the economic costs of participation (Hickey and Mohan, 2004) than
accountable service provision. A district councillor suggested that some parents look unfavourably
on enforced school attendance and may depend upon the income their children generate; and in
response to a discussion about mobilising other parents, a PTA member asked: ‘What if the parents
I have to mobilise live far fromme? Am I expected to give up my time to travel to see them?’At the
other end of the social spectrum, richer parents have the exit option of sending their children to
private schools or buying drugs from private clinics, which reduces demand-side accountability
pressures (Di John, 2007).
RD staff and CPFs also struggled to catalyse agency for collective action because of both a
deﬁcit in community ownership over public resources, and a sense of futility in attempting to gain
more information about public works or address existing problems. The district local government
awards contracts for construction works within the sub-counties to private companies, and the
bills of quantities for these works are held by heads of departments (usually the district engineer)
and the private contractor. The sub-county government is responsible for holding brieﬁng
sessions with communities about public works including the provision of bills of quantities,
aimed at fostering a sense of ownership and a collective drive to monitor and maintain the
resources in question. During interviews, village and parish councillors claimed that in practice
they do not receive information from the sub-county; sub-county representatives insisted that
neither the district ofﬁcials nor the private contractors provide them with this information; and
two district councillors from different areas refuted any suggestion of corruption at the district
level. None of the research participants communicated a sense of responsibility to chase up this
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kind of information, to maintain pressure on those above them in the system until such
information is provided, or to work with others to create pressure for the information to be
released and organise people in response to it.
A complex network of interests and incentive structures and an absence of effective
enforcement mechanisms (within local government, and rural communities more widely) was
perpetuating this absence of demand-side pressure for better governance in the region. A former
sub-county councillor described how parish chiefs are failing to carry out basic duties like
mobilising communities for collective maintenance or monitoring of resources, and investigating
cases of school drop-outs. He claimed that the sub-county chief was failing to hold parish chiefs to
account for these duties, but that he himself had also been unable to do so when in post. Civil
servants interviewed suggested that the lack of opportunities for professional development and
inadequate remuneration drains them of motivation. Civil society and government actors described
how civil servants are protected from sanctions for poor performance by their more senior patrons
in local government, usually by being transferred to another sub-county or district. In one example
of conﬂict between staff and parents, a whole school was closed down for a week, all the teachers
transferred to other areas and new teachers brought in, rather than engage in the conﬂict resolution
process advocated by RD. Horizontal accountability mechanisms are also weak because as one sub-
county councillor explained, ‘you have to be polite and humble to get votes’. Frequent rotations of
government staff mean that civil servants are often not embedded within their communities of
operation, and hence not subject to demand-side accountability pressures through social ties, as
Hossain (2010) and Tsai (2007) highlight elsewhere. Neither does their job security rest upon the
quality of service delivery because of the lack of alternative services and the lack of local autonomy
over resources and policy making (Brett, 2003; Francis and James, 2003).
The challenges of populist health and education policy making (Booth, 2012) linked to an
executive focus on regime survival (Tripp, 2010) were also shaping what RD was able to achieve.
A health worker explained how the promise of a health centre for every parish is resulting in even
greater staff shortages, as the same human resource base is expected to cover a wider number of
facilities. A parish councillor explained how the local CPF has tried to ‘sensitise people’, ‘but
parents have turned a deaf ear’ because of widespread political campaigning about the abolition
of PTA fees under Universal Primary Education. The CPF and a local councillor described how
parents see universal education as a ‘gift from government’, rather than as an initiative funded out
of the public purse that they should hold their school or local government accountable for. While
some studies link ﬁnancial contribution (through user fees or direct taxation) to political agency
for demand-side accountability (Di John, 2007; DFID, 2011), the ﬁndings here suggest that this is
also linked to governance arrangements that give people a meaningful role to play. At the state-
run schools encountered during the research, parents are passive recipients of information during
meetings, and PTA committees defunct or ineffective. Yet, historically, PTA committees in two
of the same schools were extremely active when they had an inﬂuential role to play, before the
schools were taken over by government. Similarly, at one case study health centre, village health
teams (VHT)5 existed on paper but there were no resources to support their function and the
management committee could not even think of a role for them to play.
The political capabilities outcomes achieved were also shaped by strategic and organisational
constraints. RD staff had not engaged in detailed political economy analysis of the local contexts
they were intervening in, but neither had successive donors prioritised this within their funding
requirements. Underestimations by staff and donors about the complexity and level of skill
required for the effective facilitation of transformational participatory methodologies, aimed at
accumulating more power and inﬂuence for disadvantaged groups, were also indicative of low
levels of deep-felt commitment to social change. The geographical scope of the intervention is
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too broad for staff and CPFs to offer sustained inputs of facilitative support and advice, and CPFs
operate at sub-county level without a ‘train-the-trainer’ strategy, leading to an absence of locally
embedded activists able to implement or follow up on RD’s inputs. This perpetuates dependency
on the CPFs’ information, skills and links to the political networks Williams (2004) refers to
within and beyond the sub-county.
Sub-county Dialogues
Despite achieving fairly limited outcomes for the political capabilities of service users and
parents, RD has built upon the political learning they have fostered among local leaders by
convening sub-county dialogues, which have opened up a new pattern of representation that has
contributed in limited ways to improved service delivery. During interviews, dialogue partici-
pants reported having an increased understanding about their responsibilities for ensuring quality
health and education, and that stronger relationships had been built between stakeholders at
different levels. A civil servant described how, following a dialogue, one management committee
member felt conﬁdent enough to travel to the sub-county ofﬁces and report a case of deﬁlement at
their school, and how the dialogues were beginning to overcome a culture of blame that leads to
problems being passed from one person to another without resolution.
In one sample sub-county, the dialogues have also created a drive to move beyond requests for
answerability or learning exchange towards enforcement. After successive dialogues between
2007 and 2008, RD agreed to fund and facilitate a series of meetings with a smaller group of
education stakeholders to draft a sub-county education bill, which was enacted in December
2008. Although CPFs, councillors and management committee chairs felt that they had been able
to collect and represent the views of parents and service users during the planning process, the
issues targeted by the bill and the solutions developed are telling of the elitist character of
participation within the dialogues. It is designed to tackle pupil absenteeism, school drop-outs
and child labour, rather than teacher absenteeism or poor staff performance, and focuses on
sanctions against parents and children, rather than the ability of local stakeholders to hold schools
or local government accountable for their use of resources. However, absenteeism and poor staff
behaviour towards clients were topics of debate in education and health dialogues, generating – in
the case of one county health centre, for example – apologies from staff for poor behaviour, and a
related increase in service uptake by the surrounding community.
Through the facilitation of negotiation and collaboration, rather than confrontation and demands-
making, RD has therefore been able to foster receptivity to collective problem-solving among state
and civil society actors in ways that have begun to increase answerability within local health and
education services. RD is also building the capacity of governance actors within existing democratic
structures like local government councils and management committees, rather than undermining
trust in state institutions (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005), but has achieved this through the creation of an
alternative deliberative space – a new pattern of representation – that allows new approaches,
relationships and ideas to emerge. From a grassroots perspective, however, the dialogues are an
elite-led space that is not directly ‘increasing the power of the poor’ (World Bank, 2004) within
service provision or engaging them directly in challenging the power of political elites.
By focusing on management committees and councillors, RD has clearly targeted local
educated elites rather than the most marginalised. Yet, against the context of Ugandan social
hierarchy and the absence of effective incentive and enforcement mechanisms within local
government, this strategy is perhaps attuned to the political opportunities available to Rwenzori
civil society actors at the current juncture, and has produced some positive outcomes for
answerability. By bringing local-level actors like management committee members, teachers and
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village councillors into contact with sub-county leaders and ofﬁcials through the dialogue
process, RD are facilitating local deliberation and problem-solving in ways that have led to the
development of locally relevant solutions of beneﬁt to a range of households. ‘Elite’ is also a
relational category. The community leaders RD has trained comprise a heterogeneous group in
terms of social status – one of the management committee chairs engaged during the research was
a clan leader for example, while others were literate but had not ﬁnished primary school; and
many are also parents and service users. In this way, although RD is perhaps achieving little for
the political capabilities of the poorest, they are contributing to incremental empowerment and
shifting citizen/state relations among different social strata within the spectrum of socio-
economic status that makes up rural society in Rwenzori.
The danger, as these social accountability initiatives seem to suggest, is that working with
elites becomes the only strategy, to the detriment of other potential popular sites of agency like
local associations. RD’s strategy might be more effective in enhancing the political capabilities of
lower-income households by building awareness and capacity within PTAs and VHTs or other
local associational forms, and fostering stronger links between these popular actors and more elite
representative structures.6 Without effective mechanisms for incentives and sanctions within
service providing institutions, however (Brett, 2003, Booth, 2012), and a shift in the values of
those with vested interests in the status quo (Francis and James, 2003), the literature suggests that
gains here too would be limited.
Expenditure Monitoring Research and District Dialogues
The public expenditure monitoring research and associated deliberations during district dialogues
did achieve improvements to local services, but – like the sub-county dialogues – they have
achieved little if anything for the long-term political capabilities of lower-income rural actors, as
elite-led initiatives. This was not the express intention of this initiative however, and lasting gains
have been achieved in terms of political learning by civil society activists. The creation of a new
representative space – even if not directly mandated by the social groups it sought to represent –
has fostered receptivity to NGO research, and more inclusive deliberations about local
government service provision.
During one district dialogue, two of the most critical issues to be raised about local health
services were shortages of staff and medicine. A district civil servant explained that the local
government had struggled to either identify Ugandan staff with sufﬁcient qualiﬁcations for senior
posts7 or, where the qualiﬁcations existed, ﬁnd staff who were prepared to work in the remote
rural areas that characterise much of the district. Both the district council chair and a district
health team ofﬁcial expressed a sense in which, although the stafﬁng shortage was already well-
known among district political leaders and civil servants, this research combined with lobbying
from local councillors, sub-county chiefs and religious leaders, added to a sense of urgency in
getting the gaps addressed. In January 2010, the District Services Commission gained
authorisation from the Ministry of Health for money that had been budgeted for senior salaries
to be spent on employing a higher number of more junior staff to ﬁll the gaps at health centres
across the district. Although still only at 79 per cent capacity after the increase in health service
stafﬁng, this district stood above the national average.
District-level actors have also used the research evidence for staff training and to encourage
improved performance during supervisory meetings. One former district chair formed a ‘district
council committee for education’ in response to the research, that drafted a by-law focused on
tackling high numbers of school drop-outs and poor academic performance. The law had not been
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implemented by the time the chair lost his seat in the 2011 elections, however, and it has not
survived the leadership transition.
By taking on the roles of researcher and facilitator, there is a sense in which CPFs and staff are
experiencing political learning by gathering evidence and presenting and negotiating around that
evidence, while the rural residents who they are seeking to ‘empower’ remain passive sources of
data. Yet, there were aspects to the research process that educated participants on their rights
within health and education services and encouraged reﬂection, which may have contributed,
along with RD’s training interventions, to Corbridge’s (2007) notion of an incrementally
increasing sense of citizenship. The use of a survey also ensured that service users could share
their experiences without fear of recriminations from local elites (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005).
As one-off exercises, the expenditure monitoring research and associated dialogues were
inherently constrained in what they could achieve for the political capabilities of service users and
providers in social accountability terms. The ﬁndings nonetheless provide support for Robinson’s
conclusions that expenditure monitoring interventions can improve the use of development
resources for the poor, and promote ‘a wider and more inclusive debate on the use of government
funds’ (2006, p. 21). Certain local civil society actors questioned why RD had not taken a more
confrontational stance towards local government in response to their research ﬁndings, and
sought out a stronger civil society anti-corruption coalition. For RD, this was a matter of ﬁnding a
balanced position. Leaders are ‘treading on egg shells’, as one civil society actor put it, for fear of
recriminations from central government. At least one other NGO in the region had been dissolved
by central government after becoming too vocal in its criticism of the NRM regime. In view of
this constrained political space, RD’s research and dialogue approach perhaps represents a
sensible compromise between collaboration and critique. In contrast to Chatterjee’s (2004)
critique of elitist civil society, RD staff have been able to cultivate effective relationships with
district-level civil servants and politicians because of their own often highly elite status and by
exploiting their ‘mutual needs’ (Patel and Mitlin, 2009). RD has supplied useful evidence,
information and a communicative platform for leaders to demonstrate responsiveness (ahead of
the 2011 local government elections for example), while politicians or civil servants have given
their time, and in some cases their commitment, to engagement with civil society advocates and
citizen representatives within participatory governance structures.
Reviewing the outcomes RD has achieved through training, research and dialogue, it is fair to
say that these interventions have not catalysed greater demand-side pressure for social
accountability, but have nonetheless contributed to processes of political learning about formal
rights, rules and procedures among local elite representatives, such as councillors and manage-
ment committee members. Existing knowledge about the de facto rules of the game has in some
cases worked against a drive for collective action and claims-making, out of a sense of resignation
and futility however. By creating alternative spaces for local problem-solving, RD has at least
generated a new pattern of representation that has begun to shift the deliberative focus of relevant
local elites from questions of answerability and ﬁnger-pointing towards an engagement with the
absence of effective enforcement mechanisms, and has fostered greater reﬂection and more
inclusive (if not particularly cross-class) debate (Mitlin and Bebbington, 2006). Ultimately,
however, these strategies have not re-shaped entrenched power relations between elite and poorer
citizens, or between parents/service users and the state, and this may be linked to an absence of
strategic action to tackle not just knowledge gaps but norms and values – both internalised by
low-income groups and held by governance actors in relation to their own roles and their attitudes
to low-income service users. Mitlin (2013), for example, suggests that for capabilities to become
functionalities, that is, for increased knowledge and skills to translate into actual practice, popular
actors need to become organised and interact directly at multiple levels of the state. It is through
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this strategic action and interaction that people’s own sense of self is transformed and the social
norms held by power-holders towards the less powerful also begin to shift.
Conclusions: Social Accountability or Social Transformation?
The discussion above makes a number of important contributions to current debates concerning
the ways in which NGOs can or should promote greater social accountability in particular
political-economic contexts. First, the ﬁndings support Booth (2012) in demonstrating that
demand-side strategies for enhanced accountability through more effective citizen participation
within existing governance spaces can only bring limited outcomes for the political capabilities of
disadvantaged groups in contexts characterised by patronage politics, where the institutional
channels for accountability are weak, and populist policies undermine community ownership of
services. The evidence presented here suggests that in agrarian contexts characterised by semi-
authoritarian regimes like Uganda’s, it is both the character of politics and the structure of societal
power relations that most prominently shape the kinds of social accountability outcomes that
NGOs are able to achieve, and particularly the nexus between these ﬁelds. These ﬁelds overlap in
terms of the ways in which socio-economic power relations have become intertwined with a
history of political repression and deference to authority, and the ways in which this shapes state/
society relations and grassroots political agency. These ﬁndings reinforce the case in the literature
for studies of, and approaches to, citizen empowerment to focus more clearly on politics and
power relations rather than technical ‘widgets’ or formal institutional mechanisms (Hickey, 2009;
Joshi and Houtzager, 2012).
This raises questions as to what NGOs should most usefully be aiming to achieve both for the
political capabilities of disadvantaged groups in such contexts, and for state/citizen relations more
broadly. RD’s training, research and dialogue approaches have not managed to reshape the
political networks or patterns of political representation that undermine downwards account-
ability at local or district level in the region. If anything, these have been reinforced by investing
the majority of programme resources into working with local elites. As analyses from across the
liberal/social democratic divide suggest, however, elites do play an important role in expanding
space for alliances and participation by formerly excluded groups (Sandbrook et al, 2007; North
et al, 2009). In a political-economic context where citizen agency and citizen-led action are hard
to ﬁnd or catalyse, and are contradictory to accepted social mores and behaviours, enhancing the
advocacy capabilities of rural elites is at least a start on the road to building ‘a sense of being a
citizen’ as Corbridge observes (2007, p. 197).
As isolated and donor-dependent strategies, however, such initiatives are unlikely to go
beyond minor and sporadic achievements of answerability or enforcement in contexts with an
absence of political will, linked to vast power inequalities between a poor rural majority and a
minority political-economic elite that operates increasingly centralised control over resources.
Overall therefore, the discussion here provides support for a growing body of critique that
suggests such initiatives are but sticking plasters over the much deeper and more daunting
challenge of securing better health and education for a greater number by redistributing socio-
economic power (and the political power that accompanies it in such contexts) in ways that
include those currently on the margins of the global capitalist system (Mosse, 2010; Bhattacharya
and Bhattacharyya, 2013). Beyond advocating for substantive agrarian reform, the discussion
here suggests that NGOs interested in more transformative social change need to ﬁnd ways to
support disadvantaged groups, like subsistence and smallholder farmers, to organise for the
accumulation of these kinds of power, in order to more effectively represent their interests, and
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make meaningful claims of the state. Such a conclusion requires civil society donors to focus
attention on initiatives that build the collective capabilities of farmer organisations over the long
term. For governance reformers – whether internal or external to the state – it requires the
development of institutional mechanisms that give citizen’s organisations a meaningful role to
play within local service provision, one that, in other words, provides for enforcement as well as
answerability. Finally, the analysis here suggests that Williams’ political capabilities framework
offers a revelatory lens into the politics and power relations shaping civil society strategies for
enhancing social accountability in agrarian and patronage-based sub-Saharan African contexts.
Future research could fruitfully investigate the extent to which this relevance holds across
different political-economic environments.
Notes
1. Hubbard (2007) questions Reinikka and Svensson (2011).
2. Estimates based on census projections cited within internal documentation. There are no ofﬁcial
aggregate ﬁgures at sub-regional level.
3. The research incorporated 24 health facilities and 181 schools across four districts. District dialogues
were organised in each area for presentation and discussion of the research ﬁndings.
4. Bills of quantities describe the type and quantity of materials to be used for public works sub-contracted
from local government.
5. Villages in Uganda are supposed to have VHT – a group of volunteers who in theory distribute health
information and mobilise the community to identify their health needs.
6. A related paper (King, 2014) explores the potentially deeper political capabilities outcomes achieved
when NGOs support smallholder farmers to form livelihood-based associations through which farmers
accumulate socio-economic power while learning to represent their interests.
7. The Ministry had a policy in place that ring-fenced health appointments for Ugandan nationals.
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